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Abstract
This paper considers a small open economy with an input-output in-
dustrial structure that creates vertical linkages and multiple equilibria.
An imperfect labor market is introduced by assuming unionized labor.
It is shown that a deregulation of the labor market may trigger a large,
discontinuous expansion of industrial output, as reduced wage-costs start
a circular, cumulative process in which expansions of the up-and down-
stream industries promote each other. Centralization of collective bar-
gaining may, however, also be conducive to industrialization.
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11 Introduction
A number of papers emerging from the “new” trade theory focus on pecuniary
externalities, arising in models with imperfect competition and scale economies.
Rodrik (1995), Rodriguez - Claire (1996) and Krugman and Venables (1995) are
some well-known examples. The interest in such models can partly be explained
by the fact that they give rise to multiple equilibria. On the positive side, these
models can explain why an economy may be trapped in a bad equilibrium,
but they can also provide normative conclusions and prescribe how government
policy should be used to push the economy into a superior equilibrium.
Clearly, these properties make such models interesting for analyzing prob-
lems in developing economies.1 The purpose of this paper is to investigate to
what extent labor market distortions, in terms of labor unions, can act as im-
pediments to development. It will be shown that even if only a limited share of
the population is unionized - a reasonable assumption for a developing country
- the costs of this labor market distortion may be disproportionately high, since
the economy is kept at a low level of activity.
An open two-sector model, which draws on Venables (1996), is used to make
this point. A central feature is then that an input-output structure in the
modern, industrial sector creates complementarities or pecuniary externalities
between an upstream industry (which uses labor in order to produce intermedi-
ate input goods) and a downstream industry (which uses domestic and imported
intermediate inputs, together with labor and sector-speci…c capital, in order to
produce …nal goods).
Workers in each …nal good producing …rm are assumed to be unionized and
union wages are determined through wage-bargaining. I start by investigati-
gating the possible e¤ects of the institutional setting being changed in favor of
employers, thereby reducing union wages.
1Thesemodels formalize some previous ideas in development economics such as Rosenstein-
Rodan’s (1943) Big Push or Scitovsky’s (1954) work on externalities. For a presentation, see
Matsuyama (1993) or Krugman (1992).
2When there are multiple equilibria, the following picture emerges: If the low-
level equilibrium is the initial equilibrium, decreasing union wages will increase
the downstream production of …nal goods and, subsequently, the downstream
producers’ demand for intermediate inputs. For su¢ciently large wage cuts,
domestic upstream …rms can enter, thereby lowering downstream production
costs since a larger variety of inputs becomes available. This, in turn, facilitates
additional downstream expansion. A cumulative, circular process is then begun,
where expansion in the up- and downstream industries reinforce each other,
thereby triggering a discontinuous jump from the low-level equilibrium to the
high-level, industrialized equilibrium.
While a deregulation of the labor market may shift equilibrium, I also show
that centralization of collective bargaining can be conducive to industrialization.
In this case, a central union (which organizes all labor) and an employer’s orga-
nization (which serves the interests of all …rms) negotiate an encompassing wage
for the whole industry sector. The union side then internalizes that a reduction
in the union wage is compensated by a signi…cant increase in union employ-
ment as the economy shifts from the low-level equilibrium to the high-level,
industrialized equilibrium.
The model is mainly applicable to developing countries, although the mech-
anisms described can also be generalized to developed countries. The economy
is small on the world market, which implies that the number of foreign inter-
mediate inputs and their price, as well as the world market price of …nal goods,
are taken to be completely exogenous. Domestic intermediate inputs are not ex-
ported.2 Labor market institutions constitute a segmented labor market where
workers in the upstream industry and the agricultural sector receive competitive
wages, whereas a close relationship between the unions in the rent-yielding …nal
good industry and the political system, enables the unions to extract excess
wages.
In relation to the literature, this paper contributes by introducing labor
2Exports of upstream goods can easily be included.
3unions in a context of vertical linkages and multiple equilibria.3 Using this
new framework, the paper demonstrates how large wage-inequalities in favor
of unions in key industries can have considerable e¤ects on industrial output
and employment in developing countries. It then points to the importance of
maintaining competitive labor markets, or the use of centralized wage-setting,
during transition. In di¤erent models, Agell and Lommerud (1993) and Moene
and Wallerstein (1997) also …nd that centralized unions, which eliminate inter-
industry wage di¤erentials, can improve economic e¢ciency. In Agell and
Lommerud (1993), however, wage inequalities are assumed to arise competi-
tively, whereas this paper assumes wage inequalities to arise from union wages.
Hence, competitive labor markets work as an impediment to industrialization in
their model, whereas competitive wages promote industrialization in the present
model. Moreover, Agell and Lommerud contains no explicit analysis of wage-
bargaining.
Moene and Wallerstein (1997) compare bargainingat thelevelof the …rm and
the industry, but assume that unions only have preferences over wages. In this
paper, union preferences over both wages and employment play an important
role for the wage-restraint exercised by the union in central bargaining. Indeed,
with utility increasing in employment, the union internalizes not only that a
reduced union wage can increase employment in a particular equilibrium, it also
takes into account how a reduced union wage can discretely increase employ-
ment by shifting the equilibrium. This is precisely how centralized wage-setting
enables to internalize the vertical linkages.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and section
3 investigates the relationship between unions and industrialization. Section 4
concludes.
3There is a large literature on collective bargaing, where the e¤ects of various types of
externalities are discussed (for asurvey, see Flanagan (1999)). Even though input externalities
have been noticed (see, for example Wallerstein (1990)), the above context, involving vertical
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Figure 1: The structure of the model
2 The model
The basic structure of the model is shown in …gure 1. The focus is on a
small open economy with two sectors and labor as the common factor exoge-
nously …xed at L. The industrial sector, sector 1, has two industries. The
upstream industry, X, employs labor for producing di¤erentiated intermediate
input goods, which are combined with imported di¤erentiated inputs, labor
and sector-speci…c capital into a …nal good in the downstream industry, Y .
Final goods are tradable on the world market and can be sold at the …xed
world-market price q: Sector 2 constitutes the rest of the economy, and will be
referred to as the agricultural sector. Agricultural goods, which will be used as
numeraire, are produced with labor using a constant returns to scale technology
and are also tradable at the world-market price.
52.1 Production
The downstream industry is perfectly competitive. I follow the literature and
depict this industry by using a representative …rm.4 The production of …nal
goods requires three distinct inputs; labor, capital and intermediate inputs.
Using the Cobb-Douglas technology:
Y = XaLb
Y K 1¡a¡b (1)
where a is the expenditure share of intermediate inputs, X is the amount used
of a bundle of intermediate inputs (de…ned below), LY is employment in the
downstream industry and the production function Y (¢) exhibits constant re-
turns to scale (CRS). In the production of …nal goods, intermediate inputs are















where x is the amount used of asingle variety, whereas ! (!¤) indicates domestic
(foreign) varieties. n and ¹ n are the number of available domestic and foreign
varieties, where the latter is taken to be …xed in accordance with our assumption
of a small open economy and ¾ 2 (1;1) is the elasticity of substitution between
two varieties. Using (2), we may de…ne the minimum-cost for one unit of the
intermediate input bundle X; P, as:
P ´
¡
¹ n¹ p1¡¾ + np1¡¾¢ 1
1¡¾ (3)
where p is the price of domestic varieties, whereas ¹ p is the …xed world-market
price of foreign varieties. Since varieties of intermediate inputs are imperfect
substitutes, additional intermediate inputs enhance the e¢ciency in downstream
production, as illustrated by the price index which is decreasing in n:
The capital stock is sector-speci…c, so that capital can only be used in …nal
good production. We then normalize so that ¹ K = 1: The production function
4See, for example, Oswald (1982).
6for …nal goods (1) then becomes:
Y = XaLb
Y (4)
The representative …rm takes the price for the bundle of intermediate inputs P
as given. For a given wage in the downstream industry w and a given world-
market price for …nal goods, q, pro…t-maximizing yields the pro…t function:












1¡a¡b > 0; (5)
where ¦(w) > 0 follows from 1 ¡ a ¡ b > 0. This pro…t may be interpreted as
compensation to the owners of the …rm’s capital stock K (the speci…c factor):














Next, we turn to upstream …rms, where monopolistic competition is the
upstream market form. From (3) and (5), it can be shown that the demand
faced by an individual domestic intermediate input producer is:
x = P ¾¡1p¡¾aqY (7)
In this demand function, the individual upstream …rm takes the price index P
and the downstream expenditure on di¤erentiated goods, aqY , as given.
There is a unit labor requirement in production and a …xed cost F in terms
of labor for entering the market. Assuming free entry and exit, and using the








= ¹ w; px = ¹ w(x + F); (8)
where ¹ w is the wage paid to upstream workers. These two equations determine
a unique size of each domestic …rm:
x = (¾ ¡ 1) F (9)
7We can use (3), (7), (8) and (9) to derive the number of domestic intermediate
input producers n, for a given level of …nal good production Y and a given










Note that (10) implies a minimum level of …nal good production to be associated
with active domestic production of di¤erentiated inputs. Setting n = 0 in (10),
we can derive:









aq : Inserting the number of …rms given by (10) into












if Y > YC
¡
¹ n¹ p1¡¾¢ 1
1¡¾ if Y 6 YC
(12)
Equations (10), (11), (12) and (6) describe the vertical linkages in the model.
Note that P S(Y) then consists of two segments. For Y 6 YC, no domestic
production of di¤erentiated inputs occurs. The demand from …nal good pro-
ducers is insu¢cient for the existence of any domestic upstream …rm, as entry
costs cannot be recovered. Foreign imports only are used, so that …nal good
producers face a …xed price for the aggregate input good X.
If …nal good production increases so that Y > YC, domestic upstream …rms
will enter; this is the demand linkage (cf. equation (10)). An increasing number
of suppliers of di¤erentiated input goods enhance productivity in the down-
stream industry, since a larger range of di¤erentiated inputs becomes available.
This lowers downstream production costs as the unit cost of the input bundle
P (Y ) decreases; this is the cost linkage (cf. equation (12)). A lower unit cost
of the aggregate input good will then increase the supply of …nal goods Y (cf.
equation (6)), and an increase in output may become cumulative, due to these
vertical linkages.
82.2 Labor market
The downstream industry is unionized and each …nal good producing …rm is
assumed to have a separate union. The wage for downstream workers is deter-
mined in negotiations between the representative …rm and the representative
union. Using the Nash-bargaining solution, the negotiated wage w is de…ned as
wf = argmax Gf, where:
Gf = [¦(w) ¡ ©]
c[U(w) ¡ ª]
1¡c (13)
U(w) = (LY )
° (w ¡ ¹ w)
µ ; c;°;µ 2 (0;1);
where c is the bargaining power of the …rm, pro…ts ¦(w) are given by (5) and the
demand for labor LY = ¡
@ ¦(w)
@ w follows from Hotelling’s Lemma.5 The status
quo pay-o¤s of the …rm and the union are de…ned as as arbitrary constants
ª ¸ 0 and © ¸ 0.6 The union has preferences over excess wage (w ¡ ¹ w) and
downstream employment LY of the Stone-Geary type, where µ and ° are the
excess wage and employment elasticities of the utility function.7 The comparison
wage of an individual employed in the industrial sector is de…ned as ¹ w = f 0
L;
where f 0
L is the constant marginal product of labor in agricultural production.
In other words, ¹ w is simply the competitive wage paid in agricultural production
and accordingly, the wage union members will receive if not employed in the
downstream industry. Finally, note that the price of the intermediate input
bundle P is treated as …xed in the pro…t function ¦(w). At the level of an
individual …rm, the size and scope of the vertical linkages are too large to be
internalized.
As shown in the appendix, the union wage then ful…lls:





6It will be assumed that U(wf)+¦(wf) > © +ª holds.
7Pemberton (1988) derives U(¢)as the maximand of a“managerialunion”with aleadership
interested in size (employment) and union members (median worker) interested in excess
wages. Parameters µ and ° then correspond to the bargainingpower of workers and leadership,
respectively.
9where wm is derived from the limiting case of a monopoly union (c = 0). Since
upstream workers are paid the competitive wage ¹ w, it is clear from (14) that
downstream workers earn a wage premium compared to upstream and agricul-
tural workers. All workers are then assumed to have the same skills, that is, the
labor market is segmented. There is, however, no unemployment. The labor
market condition L = LX + LY + LA, where the …rst two terms represent the
demand for labor in industrial production, determines the level of employment
in agriculture LA; which, in turn, determines the size of the agricultural sector.
2.3 Solving the model
A simple intersection of supply and demand price curves is used for solving the
model. Following Markusen (1989), it will be solved by using the price of the
aggregate intermediate input good X, rather than the price of an individual
variety, x: Due to the presence of vertical linkages in this model, these prices
will be expressed in …nal good production Y:
The supply function for …nal goods, Y (w;P); is given in (6). This function
may be inverted in order to derive the maximum price that …nal good producers
are prepared to pay for the aggregate intermediate input good X; for a given
level of output Y , P D(Y ):









A corresponding supply price must also be found in order to derive an equi-
librium. That is, we need to …nd the minimum price at which the upstream
suppliers will supply the aggregate intermediate input good. However, this is
only the unit cost for X, P S(Y ); which was derived in (12) by using the pricing
rules of the individual …rms (8).
The graphical solution is depicted in …gure 2. First, note the segmented
supply price curve P S(Y). Again, P S(Y) is constant for Y 6 YC, since …nal
good production is too small to admit domestic input production and only a
10I
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Figure 2: Multiple equilibria
…xed number of foreign varieties enter the price index at a …xed price. However,
as downstream output expands beyond Y > YC, entry of upstream …rms occurs,
thereby lowering the price index P (c.f equation (3)). The demand price curve
P D(Y) is downward-sloping for all levels of …nal good production Y , due to the
diminishing returns in …nal good production arising from the …xed factor. This
reduces the price the downstream industry can pay for inputs at successively
higher output levels.
As shown in the appendix, multiple equilibria arise if the cost- and demand
linkages are su¢ciently strong. In Figure 2, there are three equilibria S1; I and
S2, the stability of which can be examined as follows: Due to pro…t maximiza-
tion, …nal-good producers increase production whenever the demand price for
the aggregate input good exceeds the supply price, P D(Y) > P S(Y ), whereas
they reduce production whenever P D(Y ) < P S(Y ). In addition, assuming that
upstream producers enter in response to instantaneous pro…ts, upstream …rms
will enter whenever P D(Y) > P S(Y ), given that downstream supply is initially
su¢ciently large, Y ¸ YC. To see this, note that the former condition states
an excess demand on the aggregate intermediate input good X, thereby imply-
11ing that there must also be an excess demand for individual varieties x. Since
P S(Y) is derived by imposing zero pro…ts on upstream …rms, individual …rms
must make positive pro…ts and entry takes place. For the same reason, upstream
…rms exit when P D(Y) < P S(Y ) and Y ¸ YC.
Making use of this information, I must be unstable, whereas S1 and S2
are stable. Note that S1 occurs for Y 6 YC, so that …nal good production can-
not sustain any domestic upstream production and only imported intermediate
inputs are used. One the other hand, S2 is an equilibrium where the economy
is completely specialized in industrial production and all labor resources are
devoted to industrial production.
3 Unions and development
In this section, I will study how labor market policy be can used to a¤ect the
economy. I will discuss two quite opposite policies: First, I will examine a
deregulation of the labor market, then, the e¤ects of centralization of wage-
negotiations.
3.1 Deregulating the labor market
To put the analysis in a developing country-context, suppose the economy is
in the low-level equilibrium S1. Then, assume that an institutional change
occurs, where the government intervenes on the labor market by weakening
the unions’ ability to mark-up wages in …nal good production.8 In this model,
8Union bargaining power will depend on the unions’ right to organize the supply of labor
and their ability toin‡ict damageon …rms duringa con‡ict. Theright toorganizeand theright
to strike is governed by the institutional framework in the economy, however. Institutional
changes may then a¤ect their bargaining power in several ways. Such changes may decrease
the incentive to become a member of a union. With a smaller number of members, the union
is weaker in its negotiations with the …rm, which will be the result if union control over labor
supply is diminished by limiting the legal bargaining monopoly of the unions. Reformation of
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Figure 3: Deregulating the labor market
I simply assume that this will increase the bargaining power of the …rms in
the downstream industry, c. By (14), this implies a decreased wage mark-up
and thus a decreased union wage wf, which will shift the demand price curve
P D(Y) upwards, due to decreasing downstream wage costs, but will not a¤ect
the supply price curve P S(Y ), as upstream workers are still paid the competitive
wage. Thus, downstream output expands as S1 is shifted to the right, as is
illustrated in …gure 3. It can also be noted that the unstable equilibrium I
moves backwards. Indeed, if the increase in c is su¢ciently large, the wage cuts
in the downstream industry may cause S1 and I to coincide, as P D(Y ) shifts
upwards to P
¤D(Y).
By inducing further wage cuts, the deregulation may shift the demand price
curve outside the supply price curve. When P D(Y ) shifts further to the right
in …gure 3, so that P D(Y ) > P S(Y ), this generates entry of domestic upstream
…rms which, in turn, further reduces the production costs of the downstream
…rms through a greater range of available inputs, thus facilitating additional
downstream expansion. A circular, cumulative process is begun where the ex-
pansion in the up- and downstream industries reinforce each other. Cumulative
13causation will take the economy out of the low-level equilibrium S1 and into the
new industrial equilibrium S
¤
2, where the economy is completely specialized in
industrial production.9
In summary:
Proposition 1 A deregulation of the labor market can have potentially very
large e¤ects. It can generate a shift from the low-level equilibrium to the high-
level equilibrium.
3.2 Centralized wage-setting
Proposition 1 indicates that the government should restrict union power. How-
ever, as argued in the literature on macro-economic performance and collective
bargaining (for a survey, see Flanagan (1999)), wage-externalities are more e¤ec-
tively internalized when wage-setting becomes more centralized. This section
therefore investigates if industrialization can be achieved by a reform of the
wage-setting process. To keep the exposition simple, I will present the case
of centralized wage-setting in the industrial sector, where a common wage is
negotiated for upstream- and downstream labor.
Suppose that the government can in‡uence the labor market, so that a cen-
tral union and a central employer organization are created in the industry sec-
tor10. The union, which organizes all labor, and the employer federation, which
9This result is quite extreme, but arises as the competitive wage is una¤ected by industrial
expansion. It is, however, easy to “convexify” the model by introducing a …xed factor, that is,
land, in agriculture. Then, as industrial expansion draws labor from the agricultural sector, an
increasing land/labor ratio increases the competitive wage. Adding this general equilibrium
e¤ect to the cost-linkage will tend to make the supply price curve U-shaped, which, in turn,
makes it possible to derive the high-level equilibrium S2 through intersecting demand and
supply price curves, so that S2 becomes an equilibrium without specialization. This improved
realism, however, comes at the cost of analytical tractability. But it is easily shown that the
qualitative e¤ects of a deregulation do not change in the extended model
10I shall just assume that the government can provide a forum through which negotiations
can be initiated. Having established contacts, the parties may …nd that there are gains
from cooperation to be exploited, as is shown in the example of centralized wage-setting and
”solidaristic wage policy” in the industrial sector.
14serves the interests of all …rms, then negotiate an encompassing wage for the
whole industrial sector. The wage in the agricultural sector continuous to be
set competitively.
In contrast to decentralized bargaining, the central union and the employer
federation can take into account the vertical linkages between downstream and
upstream …rms. It is then useful to derive the maximum encompassing union
wage, ~ w; which is compatible with industrialization and a shift from the low-
level equilibrium tothe high-level equilibrium. Note that since upstream workers
receive union wages, the critical level of …nal output YC can be found by simply
substituting the competitive wage ¹ w for the critical union wage ~ w in (11), to
get:





Setting downstream supply (6) equal to the critical output (16) and using (12),
we have:
~ w = (A3)
1¡a¡b
¾(1¡a¡b)+b (17)
where A3 consists of the various parameters in the model.11
This exercise is illustrated in …gure 4. At an industry wage w > ~ w, there are
three equilibria S1;I and S2: In S1, the union wage, w1, say, leads to a supply
of …nal output insu¢cient to sustain domestic upstream …rms as downstream
production is below the critical level, YC(w1). To push the economy to S2;
the industry wage must be reduced which, in turn, shifts the demand price
curve P D(Y ) upwards and the supply-price curve P S(Y ) downwards. The latter
shift occurs since lower wage costs for the upstream …rms reduce the price of
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Figure 4: Centralized wage-setting
individual varieties of inputs.12 At w = ~ w; the two curves coincide, ~ P D(Y ) =
~ P S(Y). It is then clear that if the union wage is set marginally below ~ w,
downstream …rms will expand their production beyond YC( ~ w). As the demand
price exceeds the supply price, P D(Y) > P S(Y), upstream …rms enter and the
cumulative forces working through the cost- and demand linkages will push the
economy to the high-level equilibrium ~ S2.
In summary:
Lemma 2 To facilitate industrialization and shift the economy from the low
level equilibrium to the high-level equilibrium, the encompassing union wage must
ful…ll (18):
w < ~ w (18)
12To see this, substitute the competitive wage ¹ w for the critical union wage w in equation
(8). That a reduction in the encompassing wage indeed reduces the supply price, can be seen
by substituting the competitive wage ¹ w for the critical union wage w in equation (12).
163.2.1 Why may centralization be conducive to development?
Formally, the industrial wage negotiated by the central union and the employer
federation can be derived by using the Nash-bargaining solution, de…ned as
we = argmax Ge, where:
Ge = [U(w) ¡ §]
1¡c [S(w) ¡ ©]
c (19)
S = ¦ + n¼x; U = (LInd)
° (w ¡ ¹ w)
µ ; LX = n(x + F)
The employer-federation’s pay-o¤ is the aggregated pro…t made by upstream
and downstream …rms at the union wage w, S(w). The central union’s pay-o¤
is U(w), where we can note that union employment now becomes industrial
employment, LInd = LY + LX, as labor in both upstream and downstream
…rms receive the union wage w. The status quo pay-o¤s of the central union
and the employer federation are de…ned as arbitrary constants § and ©.13
Due to non-linearities, it is very di¢cult to explicitly solve (19). However,
as proved in the appendix, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 3 If the labor force is su¢ciently large and the central union is
su¢ciently employment-oriented, centralized wage-setting induces industrial-
ization and shifts the economy from the low-level equilibrium to the high-level
equilibrium.
The intuition is straightforward. The proposition simply describes conditions
which need to be ful…lled for both parties to prefer a low union wage leading to
industrialization (w < ~ w) to a higher wage which does not (w ¸ ~ w).
Employers always prefer a low wage associated with industrialization: First,
pro…ts increase when wage costs are reduced. In addition, downstream …rms
gain from having a larger range of inputs available as the entry of domestic
upstream …rms also improves productivity: The latter is easily seen from …gure
4, where the supply price P S in S1 exceeds the corresponding supply price in
~ S2.
13We shall assume that U(we)+ S(we) > §+ © holds.
17The intuition to why the union-side might prefer to restrict its wage de-
mands stems from the fact that choosing a wage below ~ w is compensated by
a massive, discrete expansion of union employment. To see this, note that at
a high wage w > ~ w, union members originate solely from downstream …rms,
as the economy is kept in the low-level equilibrium S1. By agreeing to a low
wage, w < ~ w; domestic upstream …rms enter and the cumulative forces push
the economy towards the high-level equilibrium ~ S2. However, in ~ S2 the econ-
omy specializes in industrial production and both upstream and downstream
workers are organized in the encompassing union14. Given that the union val-
ues employment su¢ciently (i.e. when µ
° is su¢ciently low) and the economy is
su¢ciently large (in terms of L), the central union will prefer a low wage leading
to industrialization to a high wage which does not.





w1 ¡ ¹ w




where I have generally de…ned two alternative wages w1 > ~ w and w2 < ~ w.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown that labor market imperfections may have consider-
able e¤ects in an environment with scale economies and imperfect competition,
where pecuniary externalities and vertical linkages exist between …rms.
It was shown that a “deregulation” of the labor market may trigger a dis-
continuous expansion of output, as the economy moves between equilibria. This
process worked through the “positive feedbacks” inherent in this type of econ-
omy. As …nal good producers increased production in response to reduced wage
14Again, specialization is an extreme result which originates from simplifying assumptions.
The mechanism is, however, more general. Even if the the high-level equilbrium would not
entail specialization, the union would still trade o¤ that areduced wage increases employment
far beyond the usual continuous expansion, as the economy shifts from the low- to the high
level industrialized equilibrium.
18costs, upstream producers bene…tted through higher demand for inputs. This
permitted entry of additional upstream …rms, which reduced production costs
for …nal good producers even further, through a more e¢cient use of interme-
diate inputs.
As noted by several writers, the existence of such “positive feedbacks” in-
dicates a coordination failure between …rms, since the pecuniary externalities
are not internalized by, for example, vertical mergers.15 Union wage policy may
worsen this coordination failure, which is the very reason for the potentially
considerable e¤ects of policies aiming at deregulating the labor market.16
However, the large potential costs arising from high union wages in key in-
dustries also imply that there are large potential gains from centralization of
wage bargaining. Indeed, the model shows that when the union is an encompass-
ing union eliminating the wage di¤erential between upstream and downstream
labor, the union internalizes the wage externality and lowers its wage demands
in return for a very large increase in industrial employment and, hence, a large
increase in union membership.
Government policies may then aim at weakening the unions or try to accom-
plish a centralization of collective bargaining to prevent wage inequalities which
might impede development.17 Centralization of collective bargaining might be
di¢cult to implement in practice, since it requires that coalitions of heteroge-
nous agents have to be formed on both the employer- and the union side.18 A
15Such internalization may fail to materialize, partly because the scope of the linkages may
be considerable, but also because the incentives for an individual …rm to take these “positive
feedbacks” into account, are much smaller than the social bene…t.
16High union wages is only one factor among several which may preserve the economy in a
low-level equilibrium. As is shown in Venables (1996), import substitution policies through
tari¤s on imported inputs may also reduce industrial output by increasing downstream costs.
17It is then interesting to note that among the East-Asian NIC countries, wages have re-
mained at market clearing levels and wage inequalities due to segmentation have been absent
during their transition (World Bank (1993)). In Singapore, the government has used a ”wage-
correction” policy (Fields (1992)).
18As argued by Lindbeck (1997), con‡icts may arise within organizations rather than be-
tween peak organizations which may lead to a situation where centralized bargaining is not
sustainable.
19deeper understanding of the relationship between di¤erent wage-setting institu-
tions and economic development, however, requires a more elaborate framework
which also models government behavior and the interaction within coalitions
more explicitly. I believe that the type of model used in this paper could be
fruitfully applied for such a task.
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23A Appendix:
First, I brie‡y derive the union wage in the …rm-level bargaining. Then, I show
under what conditions multiple equilibria arise. Finally, I derive conditions for
which centralized bargaining leads to industrialization.
A.1 The union wage in …rm-level bargaining
Proof. The …rst-order condition for (13) is:
µ
U(w)








¦(w) ¡ ¹ ¦
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; (A.1)
where " = ¡ dL
dw
w
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¡ °" (A.2)
Note that c 2 (0;1), implies that U(w)¡ ¹ U > 0 and ¦(w)¡ ¹ ¦ > 0. This ensures

























´ < 0 (A.3)
A.2 Multiple equilibria
Proof. First, de…ne the inequality (A.4):
a¾ + (1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ b) > 0 (A.4)
Suppose there exists an equilibrium S1 for which Y < YC. Then, if (A.4) holds,




PD and similarly ELY P S. By calculation:
ELY P
D =








¾¡1if Y > YC
0 if Y 6 YC
(A.5)
24Then, note that for any Y such that P D(Y ) = P S(Y ), it must be that:
ELY P







(¾¡1)a if Y > YC
1¡a¡b
a > 0 if Y 6 YC
(A.6)
From the existence of S1 and the segmented shape of the supply price curve
(12), it then follows that a second equilibrium I exists if (A.4) holds. This is
easily seen in …gure 2, since (A.4) implies that ELY P D ¡ ELY P S < 0, which,
in turn, ensures that the demand price curve intersects the supply price curve
from above at I. Due to pro…t-maximizing behavior, there must also exist a
third equilibrium S2 at which P D > P S:
Moreover, it should be noted that (A.4) is directly related to the strength
of the demand- and cost linkages (cf. equations (10), (11), (12) and (6)). Intu-
itively, the demand linkage is stronger when intermediate inputs are relatively
important in …nal-good production. This comes at a large cost-share of inter-
mediate inputs a and a smaller cost-share of capital b, which translates into a
more elastic, or ‡atter, demand price curve P D(Y )19. Furthermore, at a smaller
substitution elasticity ¾, downstream …rms value variety in intermediate inputs
more highly, as e¢ciency is enhanced in a more pronounced way by additional
inputs. As upstream entry occurs in response to an increase in demand from
downstream …rms, the price index P will decrease at a greater rate, thus pro-
ducing a stronger cost-linkage. This translates into a less elastic, or steeper,
supply price curve P S(Y )20. Indeed, both these prerequisites - an elastic de-
mand price curve and an inelastic supply price curve - are more likely to ocurr
when condition (A.4) holds.
A.3 Proposition 3
Proof. To show that proposition 3 is true, we need only show that the central
union and the employer federation prefer a union wage below the critical wage
~ w, de…ned by (18).
19A given decrease in the price index P results in a larger expansion of …nal output.
20A given increase in …nal output Y results in a larger decrease in the price index P.
25Without loss of generality, suppose the parties are contemplating two al-
ternative wages: w1 ¸ ~ w associated with low-level equilibrium S1 and w2 <
~ w associated with ~ S2 in …gure 4: To assure positive union utility, both wages
exceed the competitive wage ¹ w: To summarize:
w1 > w2; w1 ¸ ~ w > ¹ w; w2 2 ( ¹ w; ~ w) (A.7)
The employer side will always prefer w2: Downstream …rms bene…t from
lower input prices, since (i) wage costs are lower w2 < w1 and (ii) the price of the
aggregate input good X is lower, P S
~ S2(Y ) < P S
S1(Y ). The latter follows directly
from substituting the competitive wage ¹ w for the union wage w in equation
(12) and noting that w = w1 leads to equilibrium S1 and n = 0, whereas w = w2
leads to equilibrium ~ S2 and n > 0 : Furthermore, since P D > P S holds in ~ S2,
we know from section 2.3 that upstream …rms make nonzero pro…ts; ¼x( ~ w) > 0:
Turning to the union side, note that the source of union employment in
S1 is LInd(w1) = LY (w1). On the other hand, in ~ S2, union employment is
LInd(w2) = L. The central union then prefers w2 whenever U(w2) > U(w1):
Using the above information and the union’s preferences de…ned in (19), this
condition can be written as:
(L)
° (w2 ¡ ¹ w)
µ > (LY (w1))
° (w1 ¡ ¹ w)
µ





w1 ¡ ¹ w
w2 ¡ ¹ w
¶µ
°
Hence, if the union values employment su¢ciently (i.e. when µ
° is su¢ciently
low) and the economy is su¢ciently large (in terms of L), the central union
prefers the lower wage, w2 < w1:
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